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Subdued Process: Onyx Properties LLC v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Elbert County and the Removal of 
“Property” from the Due Process Clause 
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he 
may be equally said to have a property in his rights. Where an 




I. The Bronze Medalist of the Due Process Clause Trio 
Since its inception in 1868, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has served the American people as a guardian against unfair 
action by the states.
2
 Although not at first,
3
 the United States Supreme 
Court quickly discovered the clause to be fertile ground on which to 
cultivate numerous landmark opinions, notably in the areas of criminal 
procedure
4
 and civil rights.
5
 Most of these well-known and well-studied 
cases elaborate on the meaning of the Clause’s words “life” and “liberty.” 
But what about the meaning of “property” in the Due Process Clause? It is 
understandable that courts would appraise property rights as less important 
than rights concerning life and liberty, and therefore require that property-
                                                                                                                 
 1. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). 
 2. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (“We have 
emphasized time and time again that ‘[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the 
individual against arbitrary action of government.’” (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 558 (1974) (alteration in original)). 
 3. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 49, 77-78 (1873) (holding, 
as the first case interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety, that the amendment 
merely guarantees rights of United States citizenship such as the freedom to traverse rivers 
and run for federal office). 
 4. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (holding that evidence 
obtained through an unconstitutional search by the state violated the defendant’s right to 
privacy guaranteed through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (finding that the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel applies to the states through the Due Process 
Clause). 
 5. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (holding that there 
is a fundamental right to homosexual marriage guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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based claims be subjected to a higher standard to find a violation of federal 
due process.
6
 This hierarchal organization of constitutional rights has long 
resided within the heart of American legal philosophy.
7
 But property rights 
must certainly enjoy some sort of heightened protection, otherwise the 
amendment’s framers would not have included a guarantee against their 
infringement by the states among such lofty and fundamental interests as 
“life” and “liberty.” 
In 2016, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its decision in 
Onyx Properties LLC v. Board of County Commissioners of Elbert County. 
After the County Board secretively enacted a zoning ordinance, a group of 
Colorado landowners filed suit alleging that this improper infringement of 
their real property rights amounted to a violation of federal due process.
8
 
Ruling in favor of Elbert County and against its own precedent,
9
 the Tenth 
Circuit set the bar staggeringly high for successfully challenging a state’s 
interference with a citizen’s real property interests, essentially making due 
process claims on these grounds infeasible.
10
 To compound these 
difficulties, the Supreme Court has long held the view that the Due Process 
Clause does not apply to a legislative body when it enacts legislation, 
including the enactment of general zoning regulations.
11
 Simply put, in 
answering how much process is due before state or local legislatures can 
deprive citizens of their real property interests, the Onyx court responded 
quizzically: “What process?” 
                                                                                                                 
 6. For further reading concerning the difficulty in claiming a due process violation for 
property rights compared to those rights that are currently considered fundamental, see 
generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555 
(1997). 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 85 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (“The value 
of human life . . . outweighs the interest of a possessor of land . . . .”); see also Katko v. 
Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 659, 662 (Iowa 1971) (holding that a trespasser’s interest in his life 
outweighs a landowner’s interest in the security of his property). 
 8. Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 838 F.3d 1039, 1042 (10th Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1815 (2017). 
 9. See Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 633 F.3d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 
2011) (“[T]he right to use property is fully protected by the Due Process Clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions . . . .” (quoting Eason v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 70 P.3d 600, 
605 (Colo. App. 2003) (alteration in original)). 
 10. Onyx, 838 F.3d at 1049 (stating that to bring a due process violation against a state, 
the state’s conduct must be arbitrarily extreme or “conscience shocking”); accord 
Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 1995) (analyzing a 
substantive due process claim involving a zoning ordinance under the “rational basis” level 
of scrutiny). 
 11. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
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This Note will use the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Onyx to illustrate the 
profound difficulties for plaintiffs challenging improper state interference 
with real property interests in federal court, and how these difficulties 
effectively erase “Property” from the Due Process Clause. Part II will 
describe the general requirements for bringing a due process challenge 
against a state in federal court and how legislatures are immune from such 
challenges if they act within the scope of their official legislative duties—
such as adopting zoning regulations. Part II will also highlight the specific 
obstacles that arise when bringing a property-based due process challenge 
as an individual or as a class in federal court. Parts III and IV will describe 
the factual background of Onyx and the decision of the Tenth Circuit. In 
Part V, this Note will scrutinize the reasoning behind the Onyx opinion and 
expound upon two possible attack strategies for successfully bringing 
property-based federal due process challenges against state and local 
governments in the future. 
II. The Crossroads of Federal Due Process and State Property Law 
The text of the Due Process Clause declares that no state shall “deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
12
 But, 
as Justice Harlan acknowledged in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, the 
meaning of the clause is rife with vagueness,
13
 with its historical context 
providing little guidance.
14
 As a consequence, the unenviable and unending 
task of determining what exactly falls under the purview of the Due Process 
Clause has fallen to the federal courts. 
A. Does the Due Process Clause Protect Property Rights? 
The landmark Supreme Court case Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. established that the minimal requirements of the Due Process 
Clause are derived from balancing the states’ interests in efficient 
governance and the private citizen’s “opportunity to be heard.”
15
 While the 
balancing of these interests will shift the amount of process that is due on a 
case-by-case basis, the Mullane Court held that “there can be no doubt” that 
procedural due process demands, at the very least, some form of notice and 
the opportunity for an aggrieved party to request a hearing.
16
 However, 
                                                                                                                 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 13. 367 U.S. 497, 540 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It is but a truism to say that this 
provision . . . is not self-explanatory.”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). 
 16. Id. at 313. 
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Mullane did not provide any guidance on when due process requires 
additional safeguards. It was not until Mathews v. Eldridge, a quarter 
century after Mullane, that the Supreme Court proffered three factors for 
determining and weighing case-by-case due process requirements: (1) the 
private citizen’s interest affected by the state action; (2) the risk that the 
state action will wrongfully infringe upon the citizen’s interest and the 
value of additional safeguards against infringement; and (3) the state’s 
interest in economic and governmental efficiency that would be hindered by 
the additional safeguards.
17
 Perhaps Justice Harlan put it best when he 
stated that due process is the balance of two competing interests: “the 
liberty of the individual . . . and the demands of organized society.”
18
 
There is also a substantive aspect to the Due Process Clause in addition 
to its procedural element. This aspect is concerned with the inherent 
fairness of a law and whether that law infringes upon a fundamental right as 
opposed to whether the law was enacted using fair procedures.
19
 Through a 
series of decisions reaching back to 1897,
20
 the Supreme Court has 
determined that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights contain 
fundamental rights, and that these rights, formerly only enforced at the 
federal level,
21
 were now applicable to the states.
22
 The mechanism by 
which the Supreme Court selectively applied these fundamental 
constitutional provisions to the states was the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, through the process we know of today as 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 18. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 19. See Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897) 
(“In determining what is due process of law, regard must be had to substance, not to form.”). 
 20. Id. at 241 (holding, as the first Supreme Court case that incorporated a provision of 
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, that the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states). 
 21. Compare Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (“These 
amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state 
governments. This court cannot so apply them.”), with Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
326 (1937) (“These in their origin were effective against the federal government alone.”). 
 22. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (holding that the 
Second Amendment, one of the last remaining unincorporated provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, incorporates through the Fourteenth Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 666 (1925) (finding that the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment are “among the 
fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties' protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
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 In his opinion for the 1937 Supreme Court case 
Palko v. Connecticut, Justice Cardozo wrote that only those rights that were 
“of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” could be considered 
fundamental and therefore incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process guarantees.
24
 These rights were such that “neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”
25
 In short, if a right is 
recognized as sufficiently important to the liberty of the people, it is 




Recognized as important rights in the common law, real property 
interests have historically enjoyed the protection of the Due Process 
Clause.
27
 Decades after Palko, in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, the Supreme Court clarified that property interests protected by 
procedural due process “may take many forms.”
28
 These forms include 
abstract concepts like one’s interest in continued state employment,
29
 or 
even the receipt of welfare checks.
30
 In Roth, the Court examined whether 
the firing of an assistant professor at Wisconsin State University violated 
his Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.
31
 Although the Court 
ultimately found that Mr. Roth possessed no property interest in something 
so ephemeral and abstract as the mere possibility of having a renewed 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
selective incorporation process has the virtue of having already worked to make most of the 
Bill of Rights' protections applicable to the States.”). 
 24. 302 U.S. at 325. 
 25. Id. at 326. 
 26. Id. at 325. 
 27. See, e.g., Muggler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (noting that, while the state had 
the power to destroy property it deems a public nuisance, when “unoffending property is 
taken away from an innocent owner,” it constitutes a deprivation of a person’s “property 
without due process”); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental 
Constitutional Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 736 (2003) 
(“Property once enjoyed an exalted status in American constitutional law. During the 
notorious Lochner era, the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect not only liberty of contract but property interests as well.”). 
 28. 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). 
 29. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (holding that an Oklahoma 
statute requiring state employees to submit to an oath of loyalty under the threat of withheld 
salaries infringed upon a property interest protected by constitutional due process). 
 30. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (“It may be realistic today to 
regard welfare entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”). 
 31. Roth, 408 U.S. at 566, 568. 
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 the Court stressed that this determination did not 
affect the guarantee of procedural due process for the types of property 
interests recognized at common law: the “ownership of real estate, chattels, 
or money.”
33
 These classical and historically acknowledged categories of 
property interests are granted the protections of the Due Process Clause 
largely due to their concrete, non-abstract quality.
34
 
Although it must be admitted that real property interests are mostly 
created and defined by state law, it is a federal question as to whether the 
created interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
35
 Therefore, 
real property interests can be viewed as a hybrid of state law, which creates 
the interests, and federal law, which wards against their unjust infringement 
through the guarantees of the Due Process Clause.
36
 
B. A Constitutional Headache 
In federal court, proving a lack of notice or hearing is not the greatest 
challenge a plaintiff faces when seeking relief for a violation of the Due 
Process Clause. Rather, the difficulties stem from a series of Supreme Court 
decisions that have restricted the applicability of the clause to only cases 
evincing the most flagrant abuses of state or local governmental authority.
37
 
When the alleged violation of federal due process specifically involves 
state-created real property interests, there are substantial requirements that 
must be met to avoid having the claim dismissed at the outset. 
It has been well settled that if a state fails to comply with its own 
established procedures, it does not automatically foster a violation of 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 578. 
 33. Id. at 571-72. 
 34. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (“[T]he Constitution is ‘intended to 
preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories.’” (quoting Davis v. Mills, 
194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904))); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). 
 35. Waeschle v. Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 36. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 896 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that “the 
states define property,” but “[w]hether that ‘property interest’ is constitutionally 
‘protected’ . . . is a matter of federal law” (quoting Waeschle, 576 F.3d at 544-45)). 
 37. See, e.g., Azam v. City of Columbia Heights, 865 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(emphasizing “the high burden facing a person who claims a violation of his or her 
Fourteenth Amendment rights” (quoting Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 991 
(8th Cir. 2001))); Doe v. Heil, 533 F. App’x 831, 843 (10th Cir. 2013) (“We have held that 
‘[a] high level of outrageousness is required’ to establish a substantive due process 
violation.” (quoting Klen v. City of Loveland, 661 F.3d 498, 513 (10th Cir. 2011))). 
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 The reasoning behind this concept has less to do with 
the tenets of federalism or sovereign immunity, as one might first suspect, 
and more to do with the weight of paperwork. For over a century, federal 
courts have professed that they would be overburdened by the sheer 
caseload should individual plaintiffs be allowed to bring any federal due 
process challenge against a state when it breaks its own rules.
39
 
Even if a claim were successful in avoiding immediate dismissal, the 
Tenth Circuit stated that it will only rule against a state in a property due 
process case if the government action “shocks the conscience of federal 
judges.”
40
 The Tenth Circuit bolstered this position in Klen v. City of 
Loveland, where it held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should “not replace state tort 
law,” and that “deference to local policymaking” is a necessity.
41
 As a 
result, the federal circuit courts have consistently ruled in favor of state or 
local governments when deciding due process cases concerning real 
property and zoning issues, often remarking that the “federal courts are not 
to be turned into zoning boards of appeals”
42
 and that “the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize the federal 
judiciary to sit as a superlegislature.”
43
 And yet, federal court policy is not 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See, e.g., Rozman v. City of Columbia Heights, 268 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(en banc) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)); Mangels v. 
Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1986) (“A failure to comply with state or local procedural 
requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of due process . . . .”). 
 39. See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948) (“We cannot treat a mere error 
of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision 
by a state court on state law would come here as a federal constitutional question.”); Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (“Where a rule of 
conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that everyone should have a 
direct voice in its adoption.”); Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 110 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that merely “citing the Due Process Clause” is insufficient to transform a state issue 
into a federal issue); Hope Baptist Church v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 655 F. Supp. 
1216, 1219 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (“To allow the loser of each zoning decision . . . to sue in 
federal court . . . would significantly burden both federal courts and local zoning 
decisionmakers.”).  
 40. Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
 41. 661 F.3d 498, 513 (10th Cir. 2011); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 42. Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J. dissenting)). 
 43. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1996); see 
also 2 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 15:3 (5th ed.), Westlaw (database 
updated May 2018) (describing the conditions and procedure by which federal courts review 
due process challenges). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
536 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:529 
 
 
the only legal principle that protects state and local governments against 
real property due process challenges.  
1. Legislative Immunity for Due Process Claims 
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bi-Metallic 
Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization established that a legislative 
body enacting legislation cannot be subject to procedural due process 
challenges.
44
 In Bi-Metallic, the Supreme Court chose to adopt a policy that 
valued efficiency and alleviating the federal courts’ caseloads over 
guaranteeing individual citizens a right to sue their state if the challenged 
legislation had a blanket and non-targeted effect.
45
 However, the line of 
cases stemming from Bi-Metallic conceded that hearings and notices should 
be given when legislation targets individuals and small groups.
46
  
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided Bogan v. Scott-Harris, which 
clarified that legislative immunity extends to state legislatures and all the 
way down to the local level.
47
 This protection from due process challenges 
is absolute, but only in the context of “legislative” acts as opposed to those 
that are “administrative” in nature.
48
 The difference between the two labels 
can be ambiguous.
49
 A good rule of thumb is that “legislative” acts are 
those that seek to create new policies, while actions that merely enforce 
pre-existing laws are “administrative.”
50
 If an act of the legislature affects 
only a small portion of the general population, however, the act may be 
considered more administrative than legislative.
51
 Some federal circuit 
courts harbor the opinion that improperly enacted legislation, either through 
                                                                                                                 
 44. 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).  
 45. Id. (“There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is 
to go on.”). 
 46. See Ind. Land. Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 712 (7th Cir. 2004) (listing 
line of cases in which legislators possessed such “illegitimate motives”). 
 47. 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998). 
 48. SALKIN, supra note 43, § 46:5 (“Legislative immunity may be available for local 
legislators, but it is available only for legislative activities. It will not be extended to 
legislators for the performance of functions more properly characterized as administrative.”); 
see also BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION 
§ 2:25, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017) (“The initial question in determining whether 
decision making in the land use regulatory process violates procedural due process 
requirements is whether the process is legislative or administrative.”). 
 49. SALKIN, supra note 43, § 46:5 (“The distinction between legislative and 
administrative functions is essential, although it is not always clear.”). 
 50. Crymes v. DeKalb Cty., 923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 51. Id. 
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negligence or malevolence, will still be considered a “legislative act” for 
the purposes of legislative immunity.
52
  
2. Are Zoning Regulations Legislative or Administrative Acts? 
Generally, the enactment of a comprehensive zoning regulation is 
considered a legislative act.
53
 Courts have compiled several factors, derived 
from the Bi-Metallic directive, to aid in determining whether the adoption 
of zoning regulations by a legislative body is characteristically 
administrative. Courts will consider a number of factors, including: (1) 
whether the action targeted small and specific groups of people;
54
 (2) 
whether additional procedural due process protections were appropriate due 
to the lack of political remedies available to small groups;
55
 and (3) if the 
adoption of additional safeguards by the state would be unduly 
burdensome.
56
 The factors for this exception were designed to allow 
relatively small groups or individuals an opportunity to request a hearing 




3. Class Status for Plaintiffs in Real Property Due Process Cases 
Not only are plaintiffs individually barred from bringing real property 
due process challenges against a state, but they are also practically 
prohibited from forming a class to pursue their claims. Class action suits are 
designed to “make civil claims marketable that otherwise would not be 
brought on an individual basis.”
58
 Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a class may be formed in the federal system only if: (1) joinder 
of the parties and claims would be unduly cumbersome; (2) there are 
common legal or factual questions between members of the putative class; 
(3) the representative members of the class would possess claims that are 
indicative of the entire class; and (4) the representatives will fairly and 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See, e.g., Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
an action of a city government was legislative in nature solely because it “involved a 
rezoning provision” and was therefore immune from § 1983 challenges). 
 53. See, e.g., Calvert v. Safranek, 209 F. App’x. 816, 819 (10th Cir. 2006); see also 
BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 48, § 2:25 (“The federal courts have treated zoning and 
rezoning as legislative.”). 
 54. See Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1908). 
 55. See Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 710 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 56. See Kaahumanu v. Cty. of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 57. Ind. Land Co., 378 F.3d at 710. 
 58. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 97, 99 (2009). 
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adequately pursue those claims.
59
 The class may then sue if “adjudications 
with respect to individual class members . . . would be dispositive of the 
interests of the other members”
60
 or if “questions of law or fact common to 
class members” are greater than claims unique to individual class 
members.
61
 This issue of commonality, specifically in regards to the harm 
suffered, is critical for plaintiffs to successfully obtain class certification.
62
 
However, federal courts have long recognized that real property rights are, 
by their very nature, considered unique, and that it is therefore difficult, if 
not impossible, to form a class on such grounds due to an inherent 
deficiency in the commonality of injury.
63
 For example, a court will not 
recognize an entire neighborhood if it should, as a class, challenge an 
erroneously-enacted city ordinance. Instead, the court will, absent evidence 
indicating otherwise, treat the neighborhood as individual plaintiffs, each 
with a unique real property interest and a harm that is unique to that 
interest, rather than as a possible class formed merely due to lines drawn on 
a map.
64
 Ultimately, the grant of class certification resides within the sole 




                                                                                                                 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). 
 60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 62. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (stating that the 
commonality required to obtain class certification pertains to a common sustained injury, not 
necessarily that the same substantive law was violated). 
 63. Every federal circuit recognizes, to varying degrees, that real property interests are 
intrinsically unique. See, e.g., Gail v. United States, 58 F.3d 580, 585 n.7 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that mineral rights are as unique as the real property they are related to); Bean v. 
Indep. Am. Sav. Ass’n, 838 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1988) (presuming that interests in real 
property are unique). The uniqueness aspect of real property is also enshrined in the contract 
law doctrine of specific performance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also Jason S. Kirwan, Appraising a Presumption: A 
Modern Look at the Doctrine of Specific Performance in Real Estate Contracts, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 697, 698 (2005) (stating that the unique nature of real estate makes it the 
venerable example in which specific performance can be granted in a contract dispute). 
 64. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods., LP v. Ratner, 762 S.E.2d 419, 424-25 
(Ga. 2014) (holding that neighbors affected by harmful hydrogen sulfide gas pollutants 
caused by an adjacent mill could not form a class because their individual exposure to the 
gas, in terms of nature and degree, was unique, and therefore the named plaintiffs could not 
establish a “common contention” with the other putative class members). 
 65. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 706 (1979) (reviewing the certification of 
a nationwide class under an abuse of discretion standard). 
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III. The Factual Background of Onyx 
In 1983, the County Board for Elbert County, Colorado enacted a set of 
zoning regulations including a map of the county that demarcated the 
boundaries of the zones the board had created.
66
 In 1997, the board realized 
that the 1983 zoning map had been misplaced at some point in the 
intervening years.
67
 Kenneth Wolf, the county’s Planning Director, was 
charged with creating a new set of maps and regulations known as “The 
Wolf Documents” based upon his research of county history.
68
 From 1997 
to 2008, landowners within the county that sought to subdivide their 
farmland were informed by the County Board that their land was zoned “A” 
for “Agriculture,” and that the farmers were required to submit applications 
and pay the requisite fees in order to subdivide.
69
 After doing so, the 
landowners later learned that the Wolf Documents used to create the zoning 
regulations were never formally enacted.
70
 
Two different cases arose from this discovery.
71
 The first, “The Onyx 
Litigation,” involved the landowners’ initial attempt to bring a class action 
against Elbert County in the District Court for the District of Colorado 
claiming procedural and substantive due process violations by the county.
72
 
The district court denied class certification, causing thirty-two of the 
landowners to jointly file the same claims against Elbert County Board as 
part of a second suit known as “The Quinn Litigation.”
73
  
In “The Onyx Litigation,” the district court ultimately dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim and granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Elbert County Board on the procedural due process claim.
74
 In 
“The Quinn Litigation,” the district court dismissed both the procedural and 
substantive due process claims brought by the landowners, even after they 
were given leave to amend their complaint.
75
 On appeal, the Onyx plaintiffs 
asserted that summary judgment was improperly granted on their 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Brief of Appellants at 5-6, Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 838 F.3d 
1039 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1141). 
 67. Id. at 6. 
 68. Id. at 7. 
 69. Onyx Props., 838 F.3d at 1042. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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procedural due process claim.
76
 The Quinn plaintiffs argued that both their 
substantive and procedural due process claims were improperly dismissed.
77
 
Onyx and Quinn were merged on appeal by the Tenth Circuit.
78
 
IV. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision 
The court’s opinion, written by Judge Hartz, contains a discussion 
divided into two parts: an analysis of the appellants’ procedural due process 
claims and a separate section for their substantive due process claims.
79
 
A. The Procedural Due Process Claims 
The court began by stating the requirements for procedural due process 
as interpreted by previous Tenth Circuit decisions.
80
 Although the court 
admitted that the Due Process Clause commands that states grant affected 
plaintiffs fair notice and an opportunity to be heard, it subsequently held 
that a “[v]iolation of state procedural requirements . . . does not in itself 
deny federal constitutional due process.”
81
 The Tenth Circuit followed the 
lead of the Supreme Court in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization, employing a rationalization that is part efficiency argument 
and part democratic theory.
82
 This reasoning posited that unless a legislative 
act seemed to target specific individuals or groups, the burden of having to 
hear out every affected citizen would bring government to a standstill.
83
 
The court reasoned that individuals have other avenues to be heard by their 
legislatures, particularly through the political process and the “ultimate 
sovereignty of the people.”
84
 
After explaining its justifications for denying the plaintiffs’ relief, the 
court admitted that not all actions undertaken by legislative bodies, 
specifically county or city governments, are irrefutably legislative.
85
 If a 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 1042-43. 
 77. Id. at 1042. 
 78. Id. at 1043. 
 79. Id. at 1044, 1048. 
 80. Id. at 1044; see also Moore v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 507 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 
2007) (“[P]rocedural due process is the provision . . . of ‘some kind of notice and . . . some 
kind of hearing.’”) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990))). 
 81. Onyx, 838 F.3d at 1044. 
 82. Id. at 1045 (“[S]uch a requirement would be too burdensome, and the public had 
other means of influencing legislative decisions . . . .”) (citing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State 
Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)). 
 83. See id. (citing Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1046. 
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legislative act “has a limited focus” or is “based on grounds that are 
individually assessed,” the act could be seen as more administrative than 
legislative, and legislative immunity would therefore not apply.
86
 
Nevertheless, the Onyx court ultimately found that the enactment of a 
“general zoning ordinance” is categorically legislative in nature, and that 
the Elbert County Board was immune from § 1983 liability.
87
 
B. The Substantive Due Process Claims 
The Tenth Circuit found no denial of substantive due process because the 
Onyx and Quinn plaintiffs claimed only that the County Board engaged in 
misrepresentation and subterfuge, not that the substance of the underlying 
regulation violates due process.
88
 The court further expounded that even if 
the plaintiffs’ claims were valid, they were not egregious and shocking 
enough to reach the threshold for bringing substantive due process claims to 
a federal court.
89
 The Tenth Circuit believed that, though it found no 
violation of federal due process, a remedy for the plaintiffs’ grievances may 
exist under state law.
90
 
V. Cracking Onyx 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Onyx reached two conclusions: (1) that 
the Elbert County Board’s enactment of the Wolf Documents enjoyed 
immunity from due process challenges; and (2) the fact that the regulations 
were erroneously and covertly enacted does not shift the balance of due 
process interests against the government. These conclusions disregard the 
factors for measuring the amount of process due as enumerated in Mullane 
and Mathews.
91
 Because property interests are deemed to be lower in the 
constitutional pecking order, the burden on plaintiffs seeking recourse for 
infringed-upon property interests is one few successfully overcome.
92
 To 
pass this high bar and successfully challenge a state’s interference with real 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id; see also SALKIN, supra note 43, § 46:5 (describing how county boards are 
entitled to immunity from § 1983 liability for their legislative activities, and how courts 
routinely hold the enactment of local zoning ordinances to be legislative acts). 
 88. Id. at 1048. 
 89. Id. at 1049 (asserting that “[i]ntentionally or recklessly causing injury through the 
abuse or misuse of governmental power is not enough” to violate the substantive aspect of 
the Due Process Clause). 
 90. Id. at 1048. 
 91. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 92. See discussion supra Section II.B.1-2. 
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property, a plaintiff must usually demonstrate that the action of the 
legislative body is not legislative at all, but rather administrative in nature.
93
 
In the case of the Onyx plaintiffs, this could have been accomplished 
through closely scrutinizing the Elbert County Board’s procedural errors. In 
the alternative, there exists a substantive due process argument that the real 
property rights infringed upon were constitutionally protected. 
A. Procedurally Polishing Onyx 
The continuation of government and the functionality of the courts are 
undoubtedly compelling interests. The problem, however, presented from 
Bi-Metallic and its offspring leading up to Onyx is one of proportion and 
perspective: are small county boards allowed to pass legislation that affects 
a handful of individuals within their county, without notice or hearing, and 
claim the full breadth of legislative immunity equally vested in the parent 
state legislature? The Due Process Clause says no “State” shall deprive 
citizens of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.
94
 But are 
county boards, like the one in Onyx, operating as arms of the state, or are 
they acting in a more autonomous capacity? The Supreme Court in Bogan 
v. Scott-Harris found any distinction between state, county, and city 
governments to be irrelevant, as both state and local legislators derive their 
immunity from the same source—history and English common law.
95
 But 
this immunity extends only so far as the County Board’s actions can be 
considered legislative.
96
 A closer examination of the governmental action at 
the heart of Onyx reveals substantial flaws in the court’s reasoning. More 
importantly, such scrutiny exposes the action to be more of an 
administrative act than a purely legislative one. Even if the zoning plan was 
unquestionably legislative, the procedural safeguards that would grant 
legitimacy to its enactment were ineffective because the plan was not 
properly enacted. 
1. A Matter of Authority and Scope 
One of the arguments left unexplored by the Onyx plaintiffs is that the 
zoning plan particularly targeted the landowners, and, consequently, that 
the enactment of the plan by the Elbert County Board was not a clearly 
legislative act. The zoning regulation affected only a small group of 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 95. 523 U.S. 44, 49-52 (1998) “The rationales for according absolute immunity to 
federal, state, and regional legislators apply with equal force to local legislators.” Id. at 49. 
 96. See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
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landowners on potentially lucrative real estate in one of Colorado’s most 
rapidly growing counties.
97
 It stands that if local legislatures derive their 
immunity against due process challenges from its parent state, then the facts 
of Onyx should be viewed through a state-wide lens. The Elbert County 
Board’s targeting of the landowners should have met the “limited focus” 
requirement and triggered the immunities exception from Bi-Metallic and 
its progeny. The Tenth Circuit’s holding to the contrary, that the Elbert 
County landowners were not specifically targeted to the degree required to 
trigger the Bi-Metallic exception,
98
 reveals how unreasonably and 
frustratingly high the threshold is to bring property due process challenges 
in federal court. 
The Tenth Circuit response to these difficulties is that these plaintiffs 
could always “seek [their] remedy under state law.”
99
 After all, the 
Colorado Constitution has its own due process clause.
100
 But if the Onyx 
plaintiffs pursued a remedy under Colorado law, what exactly is guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause? When it comes to 
property interests, it seems that the clause has become redundant at best and 
effectively nullified at worst.  
Yet perhaps the clearest indicator of the administrative nature of the 
Onyx zoning plan is the question of whether rectifying the county board’s 
failure to follow established procedures would be unduly burdensome.
101
 
By allowing the commissioners of Elbert County to ignore the commands 
of the U.S. and Colorado
102
 Constitutions at will, the Onyx court practically 
declared the minimal requirements of due process to be undue burdens. 
Unequivocally, the Elbert County Board chose to do what was easy instead 
of what was proper, and then relied upon legislative immunity and Supreme 
Court decisions from the Bi-Metallic line of cases to get away with it.
103
 
The end result is an undeniable subversion of the original purpose of 
legislative immunity. The doctrine of legislative immunity, originally a 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See Elbert County, COLO. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://coloradoencyclopedia.org/article/ 
elbert-county (last visited Sept. 2, 2018). 
 98. Onyx, 838 F.3d at 1048 (using a Ninth Circuit case involving a zoning ordinance 
that “affected only two landowners” as an example of the degree of specific targeting needed 
to make a zoning ordinance administrative (citing Harris v. Cty. of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 
502, 504 (9th Cir. 1990))). 
 99. Id. at 1048. 
 100. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25. 
 101. Crymes v. DeKalb Cty., 923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 102. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25. 
 103. See Brief of Appellee at 34-37, Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 838 F.3d 
1039 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1141). 
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tenet of English law,
104
 was swiftly and zealously adopted by the fledgling 
United States
105
 to “encourage a representative of the public to discharge 
his public trust with firmness and success” without the fear of being sued 
by “powerful” opponents to the legislation.
106
 Instead of encouraging and 
protecting legislators from potent adversaries, the Onyx opinion promotes 
the opposite: that legislative immunity fully allows local governments to 
dismiss the Due Process Clause as a nuisance, one that can be ignored 
without repercussion when encroaching upon the real property rights of 
private citizens. What was once designed as a safeguard for the public trust 
is now used as a weapon against it. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was largely enacted to ensure that individual 
states complied with the mandates of the Constitution during the 
Reconstruction era.
107
 It was not enacted to grant local governments free 
reign to disregard state or federal procedural rules, nor protect them from 
legitimate scrutiny when they violate the law. With its decision in Onyx, the 
Tenth Circuit has widened the already expansive gap between federal 
judicial policy and what the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment 
clearly commands to the states and their local government catspaws. If a 
government is to fulfill the role of “the omnipresent teacher” that leads “the 
whole people by its example,” disregard for constitutional rights by state 
and local legislatures, and the subsequent nod of approval by the federal 




                                                                                                                 
 104. Though the concept of legislative immunity dates back to late fourteenth century 
England, it was not officially codified into law until the writing of the English Bill of Rights 
in 1689. See An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the 
Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 9 (Eng.) (“That the 
Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached 
or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.”). 
 105. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 863, at 328 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“This privilege . . . now belongs to the 
legislature of every state in the Union, as matter of constitutional right.”). 
 106. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (quoting 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JAMES WILSON 38 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896)). 
 107. For more historical context concerning the enactment of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, see Fred O. Smith, Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 625-26 (2014). 
 108. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Our 
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole 
people by its example. . . . If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for 
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”). 
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2. The Political Process Is Ill-Equipped as a Safeguard and Remedy 
The safeguards derived from the democratic process, including the 
power of public opinion and the ability to vote disfavored legislators out of 
office, are not substitutes for constitutionally guaranteed due process, nor 
are they effective against improperly-enacted legislation. The Onyx court’s 
reasoning for declaring the actions of Elbert County as legislative relies 
upon the erroneous assumption that even the surreptitiously-enacted pieces 
of legislation are vetted by the democratic process alongside their above-
the-table counterparts. But private citizens do not write or call their elected 
representatives to protest or approve of legislation they know nothing 
about. They cannot read or listen to news stories about who voted in favor 
of the latest stealthily-drafted bill. 
The Tenth Circuit believed that such political safeguards against 
legislative mismanagement and dishonesty somehow applied to the 
enactment of the zoning regulations derived from the Wolf Documents in 
1997. By following Bi-Metallic’s holding, federal courts have adhered to a 
fiction—that the sheer size of the general public would keep legislators in 
check and dissuade them from deceptive, clandestine, and pernicious 
conduct.
109
 If this belief was honestly held when Bi-Metallic was handed 
down in 1915, cases involving the underhanded actions of legislators would 
assuredly be unheard of today after the population of the country has more 
than tripled.
110
 But the reality is that the landowners suspected nothing was 
amiss until evidence of the board’s secret creation of new zoning 
documents was brought to light in 2007—a full decade after the Wolf 
Documents were enforced—in the context of a federal case.
111
 If this 
revelation had not been made, the zoning ordinance would have remained 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (“Their 
rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, 
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.”); see also Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 
616 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he relatively large number of persons affected works 
to ensure that the legislature will not act unreasonably.”). 
 110. According to the United States Census Bureau, the population of the country was 
approximately 100 million people in 1915. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, PB96-119060, POPULATION OF STATES AND COUNTIES OF THE UNITED STATES: 
1790 TO 1990, at 3 (1996). The population of the United States as of September 2018 is 
approximately 328.6 million. See United States and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 111. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Rohrbach, 226 P.3d 1184, 1187 (Colo. App. 2009) 
(detailing board’s approval of zoning map sin 1998 and subsequent but noting there was no 
evidence the board adopted the maps). 
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passively accepted and unchallenged by the Elbert County landowners 
indefinitely.  
The Due Process Clause should invalidate, in its entirety, any legislation 
that fails to adhere to constitutional and statutory due process minimums, 
no matter the delay in the error’s discovery. If it does not, then the clause is 
diminished “to a form of words.”
112
 This assertion is grounded in Tenth 
Circuit precedent. The court has previously, and quite clearly, held that 
“[n]on-compliance with statutory requirements relating to notices and 
hearings are . . . infirmities [which] cannot be overlooked and the fact that 
such an ordinance has been ‘on the books’ . . . does not instill life into an 
ordinance which was void at its inception.”
113
 Additionally, though the 
court has previously ruled that zoning ordinances fall within the general 
police power of the states, they still “must scrupulously comply with 
statutory requirements, including notice and hearing, in order to provide 
due process of law.”
114
 Plainly stated, the Onyx court relied upon the 
presence of political and procedural safeguards that simply cannot exist 
when the legislation was not correctly enacted. 
The Tenth Circuit’s labelling inconsistencies in the opinion itself further 
underscore that the County Board’s enactment was not as clearly legislative 
as the court claimed it to be.
115
 When analyzing the plaintiffs’ procedural 
due process claims, the Tenth Circuit wasted no time in declaring that the 
actions of the Elbert County Board were legislative.
116
 The Tenth Circuit’s 
subsequent analysis of the plaintiff’s substantive due process claims 
presents a misleading argument. In a single sentence, it labels the zoning 
regulation enactment as “clearly executive”
117
 when the court just spent a 
majority of the opinion belaboring that it was clearly “legislative.”
118
 Then, 
the court dismissively applied the incorrect executive standard to 
purportedly legislative action.
119
 Instead, the Onyx court should have 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
 113. Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 254 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 838 F.3d 1039, 1048 (10th Cir. 
2016) (holding that the “legislative nature of general zoning decisions” barred the plaintiffs 
from bringing federal due process challenges, while also holding that the very same conduct 
is “clearly executive”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1815 (2017). 
 116. Id. at 1046. 
 117. Id. at 1048. 
 118. Id. at 1044-48. 
 119. See id. at 1048-49 (“When analyzing executive action, ‘only the most egregious 
official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’ Intentionally or 
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labeled the action in dispute as administrative because it only served to 
enforce existing law. The county itself admitted that the Wolf Documents 




It was unsurprising that the Onyx plaintiffs consequently could not meet 
the heavy burden of proving “egregious” and “conscience[-]shocking” 
misconduct when the court exchanged definitions and standards to create 
the desired outcome in its ruling.
121
 Over half a century ago, Justice Black’s 
concurrence in Rochin v. California prophetically warned of the dangers in 
implementing such philosophical and “accordion-like” requirements for due 
process cases.
122
 In federal court, the deck was, and remains, stacked 
against the plaintiff. 
B. Substantively Scrutinizing Onyx 
Even if the act was not administrative, the Tenth Circuit’s valuation of 
the state’s interest in efficiency was erroneously weighed against the 
plaintiffs’ interest in their constitutionally protected property rights. Since 
Bi-Metallic, courts at the federal level have skewed the balance of interests 
between states and citizens in favor of efficient governance, often holding 
that the availability of unexhausted remedies at the state level precludes 
plaintiffs from pursuing remedies in federal court.
123
 This valuation 
misappraises the factors set out in Mathews as applied to the facts of Onyx. 
First, the plaintiffs’ unrestrained rights to use and possess their real estate, 
                                                                                                                 
recklessly causing injury through the abuse or misuse of governmental power is not 
enough.” (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998))).  
 120. Id. at 1042. 
 121. See id. at 1048-49.  
 122. 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952) (Black, J., concurring) (“Of even graver concern, 
however, is the use of the philosophy to nullify the Bill of Rights. I long ago concluded that 
the accordion-like qualities of this philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual 
liberty safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d. 1101, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012) (“A failure to 
comply with state or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial 
of federal due process.” (quoting Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 746 n. 4 (10th 
Cir. 1991))); Reams v. Irvin, 561 F.3d 1258, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because we conclude 
that available state remedies were adequate . . . , [plaintiff] failed to establish that her 
procedural due process rights were violated.”); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cty., 48 F.3d 
810, 829 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he fact that established state procedures were available . . . 
belies the existence of a substantive due process claim.”); Int’l Harvester Co. v. City of 
Kansas City, 308 F.2d 35, 38 (10th Cir. 1962) (“[T]he result of error in the administration of 
state law, though injury may result, is not a matter of federal judicial cognizance under the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.”). 
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while perhaps no longer considered fundamental rights, are nonetheless 
important and constitutionally protected interests. Second, though 
Fourteenth Amendment precedent has postulated that the system would 
become clogged if private citizens could bring property due process claims 
at will, both judicial efficiency and the real estate interests of private 
citizens would be better served if the courts granted class certification to 
groups of similarly affected landowners. 
1. In Defense of Property Rights 
Although “property” takes its place among “life” and “liberty” in both 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses, property has 
been relegated to a subordinate rank ever since the downfall of the Lochner 
Era in 1937.
124
 Since then, property rights have been “pushed to the 
constitutional back burner.”
125
 The Supreme Court filled the gap left in its 
jurisprudential prerogatives with the fundamental right to “liberty” in the 
lamentably oft-cited footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.
126
 
However, around the turn of the twenty-first century, property rights 
have slowly crept back into the Supreme Court’s good graces. For example, 
in Dolan v. City of Tigard, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that there was no 
readily obvious reason why property interests should be treated as any less 
important than the other rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
127
 
Unfortunately, Dolan was a case involving the Takings Clause and eminent 
domain, not the Due Process Clause.
128
 In truth, the Supreme Court has 
never respected property rights in due process challenges as highly as it 
does in eminent domain
129
 or Fourth Amendment case law.
130
 But rights do 
                                                                                                                 
 124. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION 
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
 125. Alexander, supra note 27, at 736. 
 126. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937). 
 127. 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994). 
 128. Id. at 383-84.  
 129. Alexander, supra note 27, at 735. 
 130. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth 
Amendment reflects its close connection to property.”). 
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not have to be valued as fundamental to be guaranteed,
131
 nor do they need 
to be fundamental to bring a due process challenge for their infringement.
132
 
The County Board’s enactment of the zoning regulation without proper 
notice or a hearing is immediately recognizable as a restraint upon the Onyx 
plaintiffs’ rights in their real estate, chiefly the rights to use and possess, 
without due process. Five years before the Tenth Circuit handed down the 
Onyx opinion, it held in Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Board of County 
Commissioners that the rights to use and possess were recognized as 
interests that were “fully protected by the Due Process Clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions” and “subject to a proper exercise of the 
police power.”
133
 In the context of zoning regulations specifically, the Tenth 
Circuit stated that “a municipality's power to zone must be balanced against 
landowners' rights.”
134
 Admittedly, the Jordan-Arapahoe opinion stands for 
the proposition that real property rights recognized as being constitutionally 
protected arise from “an independent source such as state law,” and thus 
real property due process claims should be disputes for state courts to 
resolve.
135
 However, Colorado courts recognize the rights to use and 
possess real property as important, if not constitutionally protected, 
interests.
136
 No amount of police power should be able to bypass this 
acknowledged requirement of due process when real property interests are 
infringed through zoning regulations, regardless of whether that power is 




                                                                                                                 
 131. Alexander Hamilton, like many other Federalists, was staunchly against the creation 
of a Bill of Rights out of fear that the people would believe the enumerated rights were the 
only ones they possessed as United States citizens. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
 132. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Court held intimate consensual homosexual conduct was a protected liberty interest under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause despite not being described by the Court 
“as a ‘fundamental right’ or a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ nor [subjected] to strict 
scrutiny”). 
 133. 633 F.3d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1025. 
 136. See City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 362 P.2d 172, 174 (Colo. 
1961) (“The right to the use and enjoyment of property for lawful purposes is the very 
essence of the incentive to property ownership.”); Eason v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 70 P.3d 
600, 607 (Colo. App. 2003) (observing that the plaintiff’s interest in the right to use and 
enjoy his real property was “certainly a weighty interest”). 
 137. See Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 254 (10th Cir. 1985). 
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2. The Federal Efficiency Problem and the Class Certification Solution 
On the other side of the balance of interests lies the government’s desire 
for an efficient judiciary.
138
 An individual plaintiff seeking relief on 
property due process grounds must meet multiple aforementioned burdens 
to avoid their case being summarily dismissed for the sake of judicial 
expediency. However, when groups of similarly-affected real property 
owners petition for class certification in an effort to assuage the 
government’s fears of inefficient proceedings, the courts often deny 
certification on grounds that the injuries are inherently unique.
139
  
Accepting the efficiency argument on its face, the federal system’s 
insistence on denying class certification to plaintiffs like the ones in Onyx is 
puzzling. The Tenth Circuit, and indeed the federal court system at large, 
bemoans the possibility of massive dockets should every individual be 
allowed to bring property due process challenges against their state.
140
 
While ensuring that the justice system remains in working order is indeed a 
legitimate, if not outright compelling, concern, the answer seems to be 
staring the Tenth Circuit in the face—in the interest of efficiency, grant 
class certification to these types of plaintiffs. 
Yet, before the Onyx court begins its opinion in earnest, the issue of class 
certification is snuffed out in an early footnote.
141
 The Tenth Circuit’s off-
handed dismissal of a solution to an issue afflicting the entire court system 
stems mainly from an erroneous application of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.
142
 In Dukes, Justice Scalia 
clarified that the commonality requirement in Rule 23(b) is not a 
commonality of injuries suffered amongst the class, but whether the 
resolution of the class action had “the capacity . . . to generate common 
answers.”
143
 When Onyx was at the trial stage, the District Court of 
Colorado interpreted Dukes as having defined the class formation 
commonality requirement as stating that each class member must have been 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 838 F.3d 1039, 1045 (10th Cir. 
2016) (stating that granting individual landowners a chance to be heard before adopting 
legislation “would be too burdensome”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1815 (2017). 
 139. See discussion supra Section II.B.3. 
 140. See discussion supra Section II.B.1. 
 141. Onyx, 838 F.3d at 1043 n.1 (“[W]e need not address the Onyx plaintiffs’ arguments 
concerning denial of class certification . . . because any potential claims based on the same 
alleged due-process violations must also fail.”). 
 142. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 143. Id. at 350 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 58, at 132). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/6
2019]       NOTES 551 
 
 
harmed to the exact same degree.
144
 This is a misleading interpretation of 
Rule 23(b). The plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) 
only commands “that the questions of law or fact common to class 




In Onyx, the members of the putative class were all landowners affected 
by the same zoning regulation promulgated by the Wolf Documents.
146
 
Each class member alleged due process violations stemming from the 
zoning regulation’s improper restraint on their rights to use and possess.
147
 
By the Supreme Court’s standard set out in Dukes, the Onyx plaintiffs met 
the commonality of injury requirement since an answer on whether the 
Wolf Documents passed constitutional muster would be relevant to every 
member of the class. The benefits of granting class certification to plaintiffs 
like those in Onyx would be substantial. In addition to helping restore real 
property rights to their historic seat in American legal thought, the 
judiciary’s interest in an efficient system would be served, and the Due 
Process Clause would once more be enforced in its entirety. 
VI. The Rocky Road Left by Onyx 
It would be easy to write off Onyx as an innocuous opinion. Even if they 
were successful at trial, the remedy options available to the landowners 
would likely have been limited to some form of injunctive relief against 
Elbert County.
148
 And what would such relief truly accomplish when the 
County Board could simply re-enact the same zoning ordinance again under 
proper procedures? While this perspective has merit, it misses the big 
picture. Onyx is only the latest symptom of two much graver ailments: the 
legislative overreaching by local governments with impunity and the steady 
erosion of the rights ensured by the Due Process Clause in the name of 
convenience. As a result, plaintiffs like the ones in Onyx will find no 
remedy when a state infringes upon their real property interests except in 
the most egregious and flagrant circumstances. Instead, they will fall 
through the cracks of a judicial system that has derogated the Due Process 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 295 F.R.D. 506, 511-12 (D. Colo. 
2013), aff’d, 838 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1815 (2017). 
 145. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 146. Onyx, 838 F.3d at 1041. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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Clause’s protections in this area to a point where they are effectively 
meaningless. 
Nonetheless, “[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new 
conditions and purposes.”
149
 Though the prestige of property rights has 
remained tarnished since the downfall of the Lochner era, what exactly is 
considered a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause is not, 
and never will be, set in stone.
150
 A day may come when real property 
rights once again enjoy the constitutional limelight, for as American society 
grows and advances, what is considered a fundamental right will 
necessarily have to change as well. 
A chance for such a change took place on January 26th, 2017, when the 
Onyx plaintiffs petitioned the United States Supreme Court to either 
reaffirm Bi-Metallic, or to once again recognize that real property rights are 
fully protected by the Constitution, if not fundamental. Regretfully, the 
Supreme Court did not seize upon this opportunity to clarify its positions. 
Nor did the Court comment on the possibility of curtailing modern 
legislative immunity for actions that encroach upon the real property 
interests of private citizens, especially those actions that did not undergo 
even a minimal amount of due process.
151
 With only silence from our 
highest Court, we are left with a blind spot in the law, one which local 




                                                                                                                 
 149. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
 150. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“To rely on a tidy formula for the 
easy determination of what is a fundamental right . . . may satisfy a longing for certainty but 
ignores the movements of a free society.”). 
 151. The United States Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari 
to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on April 24, 2017. Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of 
Cty. Comm’rs, 137 S. Ct. 1815 (2017). 
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